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The EuroLinux File on Software Patents

 

Economy

Recent theoretical and statistical studies based on dynamic models tend to prove that overly broad patents not only reduce competition but also reduce innovation in the software industry or in any industry which produces complex systems based on "sequential innovation" (Web, consulting, education, management, etc.). Principles such as "the more property, the more innovation" or "stronger patents promote innovative SMEs" are definitely wrong in the case of software.

Some kind of weak protection which allows partial imitation and prohibits at the same complete rip-off appears to be the optimal model to reach. Copyright, which prohibits copying but allows imitating functionality or technologies appears to be an optimum in the case of software. It is therefore not desirable to grant patents on software.

However, if such software patents are granted, it is desirable to reduce as much as possible the property rights granted to the patent owner in order to prevent blocking situations or market linkage effects. The "software useright" model achieves this goal by distinguishing two independent markets, a first market for the rights to copy software (but not to use it) and a second market for the rights to use software techniques. In this model, most undesirable effects of software patents tend to disappear.

Sequential Innovation, Patents and Imitation - James Bessen, Eric Maskin. MIT and Harvard.

This article introduces a dynamic model more suited to sequential innovation as it exists in such industries as software, micro-electronics. It shows that broad and strong patent policies tend to reduce innovation. A statistical analysis of innovation in the software industry tends to confirm this model.

http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf

Software Useright, Solving Inconsistencies of Software Patents. Jean-Paul Smets.

This "all-in-one" article compares the economy of copyright and the economy of patents in the case of software with a layered approach (inventors, traders, publishers). It shows that software patents tend to promote industrial secrecy, which is inconsistent with their historical goal to promote knowledge sharing, and to eliminate innovative competitors, which is also inconsistent with their supposed economic effect. It also shows that it is possible to create a layered market for IP rights where patent licenses and copyright licenses are traded independently. This layered approach tends to eliminate blocking patents as well as obvious patents without any State intervention.

http://www.smets.com/it/policy/useright/useright.pdf

Software Patents Tangle the Web. Seth Shulman. Techreview. MIT's magazine of innovation

This article reminds that overly broad patents tend to stifle innovation in emerging industries and that it has never been the objective of patents to grant a monopoly for every shadow of shade of an idea.

http://www.techreview.com/articles/ma00/shulman.htm